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Mostly invigorated by infrahumanisation theory, our knowledge on processes
of dehumanisation in intergroup relations has grown considerably in the last
decade. Building on these earlier endeavours, the present chapter reviews some
recent empirical extensions that highlight the importance of diﬀerentiating
between ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation because they
are often moderated by speciﬁc variables. The role of these separate processes
is discussed as a function of the main structural elements that deﬁne intergroup
behaviour; that is, the deﬁning boundaries of the groups, the relation between
the groups at hand, and the ideologies of its members. Finally, the role of the
diﬀerent senses of humanness is discussed, suggesting that the folk conception
of humanness diﬀers between cultures.
Keywords: Outgroup dehumanisation; Ingroup humanisation; Intergroup
boundaries; Intergroup relations; Ideologies.
Dehumanisation involves viewing others as less than human. History is ﬁlled
with events that exemplify the scaling of others on the human dimension.
In Ancient Greece, Barbarians were strangers not able to speak Greek but
they were considered (almost) equals. It was with mounting slavery and
the expanding Roman Empire that Barbarians came to be seen as stupid,
dangerous, and living like animals. Explorers (see, e.g., Jahoda, 1999;
Todorov, 1989), scientists (e.g., de Buﬀon 1833–34), anthropologists (e.g.,
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Le´vi-Strauss, 1952/1987; Sumner, 1906) have always noted that people
glorify their groups while vilifying the strangers. Jahoda (1999), for example,
reports early descriptions of navigators around the African coasts—
inhabitants were portrayed as animals full of lust and evilness.
While history has provided many examples of dehumanisation, social
psychology has only recently started to unravel the reasons why it is so
diﬃcult to grant equal humanness to all human beings. Indeed, an ever-
increasing amount of research has shown that people tend to diﬀerentiate
others on the very fact that they are fully human. These research eﬀorts have
emphasised that dehumanisation is a pervasive phenomenon in interperso-
nal and intergroup contexts that occurs in a large variety of social domains.
The common reported ﬁnding is that humanness is reserved to describe
one’s own group (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007;
Leyens et al., 2000) or the self (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005),
denying full humanness to others.
In the present review we will focus on the role of dehumanisation in
intergroup relations. Broadly speaking, intergroup relations are determined
by three structural elements: the deﬁning boundaries of the groups at hand,
the socio-structural relations between the groups, and the ideologies of their
group members. We will use this framework to discuss dehumanisation as
an intergroup phenomenon that aﬀords crucial importance to boundaries,
that is nourished by ideology, and that aﬀects relations more than it mirrors
them. The way each of these three structural elements moderates the
humanness that is conferred to the ingroup and that is denied to the
outgroup will be discussed separately. Most research eﬀorts have focused
on the dehumanisation of the outgroup or concentrated on understanding
the relative diﬀerence between the ingroup and the outgroup in human
terms. Only recently has ingroup humanisation been studied as a separate
phenomenon that is determined by speciﬁc variables. Therefore ingroup
humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation will be reviewed separately as
a function of the three structural elements that determine intergroup
relations in general. Finally we will highlight some of the recent
developments in our understanding of humanness, the quality that is denied
when people dehumanise. More speciﬁcally we will review cross-cultural
research suggesting the existence of intercultural diﬀerences in people’s folk
conception of humanness. Before introducing an integrative framework of
dehumanisation in intergroup relations, however, we will brieﬂy review the
main approaches that have been proposed in the literature up to now.
DIFFERENT APPROACHES IN DEHUMANISATION
In the last decade several theories have studied the phenomenon of
dehumanisation, extending its original conception. Dehumanisation has
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mostly been related to extreme reactions of aggression and hatred (Bandura,
Underwood, & Fromson, 1975) and seen as a destructive process in violent
conﬂict situations (Bar-Tal, 1989; Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004; Opotow,
1990; Staub, 1990). These more recent approaches have emphasised that
processes of dehumanisation can be common and apply outside the
domains of violence and cruelty. The two main approaches will be brieﬂy
introduced: the infrahumanisation theory of Leyens and colleagues (2000)
and Haslam’s (2006) two-dimensional model of humanness that diﬀerenti-
ates between animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. Finally, another
way of operationalising nonhuman perceptions will be discussed, analysing
the study of dehumanising metaphors.
Infrahumanisation theory
Leyens and his colleagues (2000; for a recent review see Leyens et al., 2007)
were the ﬁrst to launch the idea that humanness is not a given but a dynamic
dimension of social judgement on which people are diﬀerentiated.
Speciﬁcally, ingroups were expected to have a more human social identity
than (some) outgroups. This original hypothesis emphasised the relative
nature of the diﬀerence in humanness between groups and distinguished it
from the absolute denial of humanity that the term dehumanisation would
imply. Therefore Leyens and colleagues called the phenomenon infrahuma-
nisation and insisted on its subtle expression. Leyens and colleagues (2000)
also provided a tool to measure humanness. In their research they
diﬀerentiated between primary or non-uniquely human emotions that are
believed to be shared with other animals (e.g., surprise, anger, joy, and fear)
and secondary or uniquely human emotions that are only expressed by
human beings (e.g., hope, regret, enthusiasm, and remorse). Focusing on
these emotions they found that people commonly attribute more secondary
emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups but do not diﬀerentially
attribute the primary emotions (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001). Given that
secondary emotions are an ‘‘essential’’ aspect of what constitutes a human
being (Demoulin, Leyens, et al., 2004), this bias reﬂects people’s tendency to
reserve full humanness to describe their own group, attributing a somewhat
lesser humanity to the outgroup.
The main hypotheses of infrahumanisation have been tested using
diﬀerent paradigms and stimuli to establish its validity and generalisability
(for complete reviews see Demoulin, Rodrı´guez-Torres, et al., 2004; Leyens
et al., 2003, 2007). Our ﬁrst attempt examined whether there was a
preferential association between the ingroup and uniquely human emotions.
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) was run with several ingroups and
outgroups occupying diﬀerent status, and the emotions, primary and
secondary, were either positive or negative (Paladino et al., 2002). In four
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experiments people reacted more rapidly when the ingroup was associated
with secondary emotions and the outgroup with primary emotions than
when the reverse was the case. The classic IAT does not allow the researcher
to identify the precise association that causes this eﬀect. Boccato, Cortes,
Demoulin, and Leyens (2007) elucidated this ambiguity, conﬁrming the
initial premise of infrahumanisation theory. In a series of priming
experiments they found that people were particularly quick in associating
the ingroup with secondary emotions compared to the outgroup, while no
diﬀerences were found for primary emotions.
We also tested for a preferential attribution of uniquely human emotions
to the ingroup. Among a list of primary emotions, secondary emotions, and
ﬁller items participants are asked to select about 10–12 characteristics that
are most prototypical of the ingroup or the outgroup. The comparison
between ingroup and outgroup can be made between (e.g., Leyens et al.,
2001) or within (e.g., Cortes et al., 2005) participants. The recurrent ﬁnding
is that more positive and negative secondary emotions are attributed to the
ingroup than to the outgroup. This pattern of data was found with diﬀerent
groups (Demoulin et al., 2009), in a large variety of contexts (Rodriguez-
Pe´rez, Delgado-Rodriguez, Betancor-Rodriguez, Leyens, & Vaes, 2011), and
even with children of 6/7 years old (Martin, Bennett, & Murray, 2008).
Importantly, alternative explanations of the infrahumanisation eﬀect
have been discarded. Secondary emotions are not intense and not very
visible; therefore it could be that only familiar people could attribute them
to each other, explaining the preferential attribution of secondary emotions
to the ingroup in terms of familiarity. This familiarity hypothesis was
examined by Cortes et al. (2005), who collected data for diﬀerent outgroups
that varied in terms of familiarity with the ingroup. Familiarity was
measured by asking participants to indicate the number of people they knew
of each outgroup and how much contact they had with them. Diﬀerences
in familiarity did not predict infrahumanisation, and thus cannot account
for the infrahumanisation eﬀects we have observed.
Even though infrahumanisation is a common and pervasive phenomenon
that occurs outside the domains of violence and conﬂict, it has clear negative
behavioural consequences. Vaes and colleagues investigated people’s
reactions when an outgroup member expressed secondary emotions,
examining a range of diﬀerent situations involving perspective taking (Vaes,
Paladino, & Leyens, 2004), political credibility (Vaes, Paladino, &
Magagnotti, 2011), imitation, avoidance reactions (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli,
Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003), and helping behaviour (Vaes et al., 2003;
Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002). In all these contexts a similar pattern
of results was reported that is best demonstrated with an example. Carella
and Vaes (2006), adapting the lost e-mail (Stern & Faber, 1997) and lost
letter (Milgram, 1977) paradigms, sent a lost SMS to naive participants.
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This paradigm, like its predecessors, consists in sending a large amount of
manipulated messages that are all wrongly addressed. Each participant
receives only one message and can decide to respond to it with a new
message conveying the participant’s stance towards the original sender. In
this study the message was ostensibly written by an Italian ingroup or a
German outgroup member. In the message the male sender expressed his
rage (primary emotion) or resentment (secondary emotion) at being thrown
out of his apartment. Table 1 summarises the results of the content analyses
of participants’ responses. Replicating the pattern of results that was
reported in previous work, participants used more words and gave more
positive responses when they replied to an ingroup member compared to an
outgroup member who expressed secondary emotions. No such diﬀerences
occurred when primary emotions were expressed.
This recurrent ﬁnding was explained in a subsequent set of studies (Vaes,
Paladino, & Leyens, 2006) that showed that ingroup and outgroup members
who express secondary emotions activate humanness to a diﬀerent extent.
While an ingroup member expressing secondary emotions was implicitly
seen as more human, the humanity of an outgroup member who expressed
the same emotion was not recognised, making human concepts less
accessible. Parallel ﬁndings have been obtained recently in work on
intergroup forgiveness. Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett (2012) looked at the
role of intergroup apologies for historical transgressions in intergroup
forgiveness and reported that these attempts were impaired when outgroup
transgressors expressed their apologies in terms of secondary compared to
primary emotions. It is indeed hard to see such an apology as genuine if one
denies others the capacity to experience uniquely human emotions.
All in all, these studies verify the postulated interpretation given to the
previous ‘‘association’’ experiments (Boccato et al., 2007; Leyens et al.,
2001; Paladino et al., 2002): People preferentially associate their group
with secondary emotions because such a link shows their humanity. When
TABLE 1
Content of SMS responses as a function of sender’s group membership and expressed
emotion
Primary emotion Secondary emotion
Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup
Mean number of words 6.82ab 10.71a 9.58a 6.31b
Positivity of the message 3.60ab 4.08a 4.06a 3.18b
Taken from Carella and Vaes (2006). Means with diﬀerent superscripts signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
each other p5 .05. Published with permission.
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outgroup members try to do the same, expressing uniquely human emotions,
they provoke negative behavioural reactions.
Differentiating animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation
Meanwhile other perspectives emerged proposing that an adequate under-
standing of humanness—the quality that is denied to others when they are
dehumanised—is necessary in order to get a full grasp of what it means to
dehumanise others (Haslam, 2006). When people are asked what makes
them human, they mention a great variety of characteristics that can be
deﬁned either as core or essential features or as uniquely human attributes
that diﬀerentiate us from other species. Indeed, as with all things, humans
can be deﬁned by listing all their central and core attributes or by comparing
them with other beings and emphasising their unique aspects. Haslam (2006;
see also Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008) systematically looked
at the human concept from these perspectives and in this way distinguished
between two senses of humanness. The ﬁrst includes a set of core or central
human attributes that involve emotionality, warmth, cognitive openness,
agency, and depth, and is referred to as human nature. The second type of
humanness sets us apart from animals, is denoted as human uniqueness, and
results in a list of uniquely human characteristics that involve, civility,
reﬁnement, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity. According to these
authors two forms of dehumanisation result from the denial of these senses
of humanness. One involves the perception of others as more machine-like,
denying human nature attributes, and has been called mechanistic
dehumanisation, while the other occurs when we have an animalised view
of others, denying them uniquely human traits, and has been referred to as
animalistic dehumanisation. This double view of dehumanisation is
illustrated in a study by Loughnan and Haslam (2007). Using a go–no-go
task the authors showed that artists, a social category pretested to be high
in human nature, was indeed associated more with human nature traits,
while business people were more easily associated with uniquely human
traits. Moreover, social categories that lacked one form of humanness were
associated with the corresponding type of nonhuman. Artists’ lack of
uniquely human traits led them to be associated with animals. Business
people were instead seen as short on human nature traits and were
associated more easily with automata.
Haslam and his colleagues (2005) ﬁrst demonstrated the importance of
diﬀerentiating between the senses of humanness when studying the
phenomenon of ‘‘self-humanisation’’. In an impressive set of studies Haslam
and colleagues (see Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008, for a review) found that
people believed they were particularly good (better) examples of their
species, perhaps because they do not wish to seem deviant. More precisely,
WE ARE HUMAN, THEY ARE NOT 69
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [b
-o
n: 
Bi
bli
ote
ca
 do
 co
nh
ec
im
en
to 
on
lin
e I
SP
A]
 at
 11
:24
 09
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
these authors consistently noted that people attributed more human nature
personality traits (or emotions and values) to themselves, especially
undesirable ones, than to other members of the ingroup. Nothing happened
for uniquely human traits, a ﬁnding that initially did not cause much of a
surprise given that the attribution of this dimension was only shown to diﬀer
between groups. Indeed, infrahumanisation is an intergroup, and not an
interpersonal phenomenon (Cortes et al., 2005; Leyens et al., 2003).
When assigning human nature to groups, valence seemed to play a crucial
role, even more so than in an interpersonal setting. In a recent set of studies
Koval, Laham, Haslam, Bastian, and Whelan (2012) showed that only
negative personality traits are judged higher in human nature when they are
assigned to the ingroup compared to the outgroup, a ﬁnding they did not
observe for positive traits. According to these authors, people humanise the
ﬂaws of their ingroup because mitigating the ﬂaws of one’s own group as
‘‘only human’’ may serve a group protective function. Importantly, they
only found these eﬀects on human nature judgements; indeed both positive
and negative ingroup traits were judged higher in human uniqueness than
when the same traits were attributed to the outgroup (see also Paladino &
Vaes, 2009). Compared to uniquely human attributes, human nature traits
are essentialised (i.e., seen as deep, inherent, and immutable) and more
universal. As such, judging ingroup ﬂaws high on human nature implies that
these negative characteristics are inborn, uncontrollable, and shared by a
large number of people, thus reducing people’s fear of being seen as a
deviant.
Dehumanising metaphors
Loughnan, Haslam, and Kashima (2009) diﬀerentiated between research on
dehumanisation that focuses on the denial of human characteristics to
others and that which focuses on the association of others to nonhuman
entities. These two diﬀerent approaches have been called attribute-based and
metaphor-based dehumanisation. The so-called attribute-based approaches
ﬁrst deﬁne and select human characteristics and then verify if they are
attributed diﬀerently to social targets. Both the previously mentioned
theories can be seen as examples of this approach. Leyens and his colleagues
(2000) mostly focused on the attribution of secondary emotions, and the
work of Haslam and his collaborators (Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008)
selected diﬀerent personality traits that best represented the high and low
poles of the two senses of humanness to measure dehumanisation.
Metaphor-based approaches instead directly study the possibility that
outgroups are likened to a nonhuman entity, such as animals or robots.
Enemy descriptions in intergroup conﬂict situations, for example, often
contain direct references to animal images. The Nazis called the Jews ‘‘rats’’
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before and during the Second World War; and the Hutu-led Radio Rwanda
used the terms ‘‘cockroach’’ and Tutsis interchangeably before and during
the Rwandan genocide (Kellow & Steeves, 1998). Metaphors are often
strong images that can stick to the targets to which they were originally
attributed, even when the conﬂict or the period of oppression is long gone.
Examples of such images are central in Jahoda’s (1999) historical thesis in
which he analyses examples and testimonies of early travellers describing
unknown tribes in newly discovered continents. Interestingly he connects the
ancient ‘‘images of savages’’ with the endurance of modern prejudice today,
stating that ‘‘the key image in this connection, and the one that has survived
most stubbornly, is that of ‘animality’,’’ (Jahoda, 1999, pp. 243–244). One
such surviving metaphor that recently received renewed attention is the
association between Blacks and apes. Goﬀ, Eberhardt, Williams, and
Jackson (2008) showed that White Americans tended to associate Blacks
more with ape images than with other wild animals, while none of these
associations was observed for White targets. Moreover, making an
association between Blacks and apes salient had clear negative con-
sequences for the treatment of Black targets. In an archival study (Goﬀ
et al., 2008) apelike images were shown to be more frequently used when
describing Black compared to White criminals convicted for capital
crimes, and the use of these images was positively linked with the
convict’s chances of actually being executed. Importantly, and in line with
the other forms of dehumanisation introduced above, the Black/ape
association appeared independently of participants’ explicit knowledge
regarding this association and was not reducible or related to prejudice
towards Blacks.
A more systematic investigation of the animal metaphors and dehuma-
nisation stems from Haslam, Loughnan, and Sun (2011). These authors
analysed the factors that make animal metaphors oﬀensive and proposed a
content-by-context approach. Testing a large variety of animal metaphors
they found that the most oﬀensive ones were those that involve disliked
animals (e.g., snakes, rats, and leeches) and those that are perceived to
dehumanise the target (e.g., dog and ape). In the former case the targets are
not literally seen as a rat or a leech. Instead, these metaphors convey the idea
of depravity and moral disgust, and are judged as oﬀensive for this reason.
The latter highly oﬀensive metaphors express more than a disgusting
meaning, a degrading meaning. These were the types of metaphors
expressing the belief that the target is less than human, and were more
likely judged as implying that the target literally equates to a speciﬁc animal.
Interestingly, calling people animals is not invariably dehumanising and
depends highly on the context of use. Especially when animal metaphors
were applied to ingroup members or expressed in a jocular manner, they
were not seen as denying the target’s humanity. As such, these studies
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showed for the ﬁrst time that animal metaphors are oﬀensive to the extent
that they imply a view of the target as less than human.
Summary
The attribute-based and metaphor-based approaches that are summarised
above have dominated research on dehumanisation in the past 10 years.
Broadly speaking they can be diﬀerentiated on the operationalisation of
the characteristic that is denied to others when they are dehumanised.
Infrahumanisation theory has focused on the denial of secondary emotions;
Haslam and colleagues focused on uniquely human and human nature traits
to deﬁne humanness and their respective forms of dehumanisation; and
mainly animal metaphors have been used in yet another line of research to
study processes of dehumanisation. These approaches to dehumanisation all
have their speciﬁcities and can lead to diﬀerent social consequences (see, for
example, Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011), but perhaps
they have more in common than has been acknowledged until now. Recent
research (Loughnan et al., 2009) has shown that attribute-based dehuma-
nisation is highly related to the attribution of corresponding dehumanising
metaphors. Speciﬁcally, these authors gave a description of a ﬁctitious group
that lacked one type of humanness or was associated with a nonhuman
metaphor (animal or machine). Results conﬁrmed that participants
dehumanised the ﬁctitious target and inferred the corresponding type of
attribute- or metaphor-based perception (e.g., perceived a group as animal-
like after learning that it lacked uniquely human attributes, and vice versa).
As such, attribute-based dehumanisation led to metaphor-based dehuma-
nisation and vice versa.
In the present review we want to propose yet another type of
dehumanisation that we will call target-based dehumanisation. In this
approach the speciﬁc characteristic that is denied to others is less important;
instead the target to which humanness gets attributed or denied becomes
the central variable of analysis. To reinforce this focus we will use the
term dehumanisation to refer to any process that involves the diﬀerential
attribution of humanness more to an ingroup than an outgroup,
independently of the speciﬁc deﬁnition or operationalisation of humanness
that is used. Even though in the ﬁrst experiments the denial of secondary
emotions was seen as the sole indicator of infrahumanisation, the same term
has also been used when uniquely human traits were denied to others (see,
for example, Vaes & Paladino, 2010) or when animal words were mostly
associated with the outgroup (see, for example, Viki, Winchester, Titshall, &
Chisango, 2006). These more recent ﬁndings suggest that the diﬀerences
between the various approaches to dehumanisation and the operationalisa-
tions and paradigms they use are blurring. Therefore we choose to use the
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term dehumanisation to name any process that involves the diﬀerential
attribution of humanness to an ingroup and an outgroup, while the term
infrahumanisation will only be used when referring to the original
formulation of the theory.
TARGETS OF DEHUMANISATION AND THEIR
MODERATORS
We will now introduce the term target-based dehumanisation and evidence
will be provided showing that diﬀerentiating between outgroup dehumani-
sation and ingroup humanisation is important as they seem to be moderated
by diﬀerent variables. Second, the known moderators of both outgroup
dehumanisation and ingroup humanisation will be discussed in an
integrative framework that builds on the three structural elements that
deﬁne intergroup relations in general. In this exercise we will verify whether
people’s tendency to humanise the ingroup and dehumanise the outgroup
varies as a function of the deﬁning boundaries of the group, the socio-
structural relations between groups, and the ideologies of its group
members.
Target-based dehumanisation: To whom humanity is attributed
Paladino and Vaes (2009) proposed that the ‘‘human meaning’’ of
characteristics depends at least in part on the category to which they are
attributed. What these authors proposed is the reversal of the causal link
usually implied in dehumanisation research: not only are characteristics that
are human attributed more to ingroups, but characteristics that are
attributed to ingroups are also judged to be more human than when the
same characteristics are attributed to outgroups. In sum, the humanness of
a trait is not a given, but it depends, at least in part, on the target to which it
is attributed, and is therefore called target-based dehumanisation.
While the underlying rationale for this hypothesis is consistent with the
general tenets of infrahumanisation theory, analogies can be found in the
ingroup projection model. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999; Wenzel,
Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003), for example, state that people
tend to project, and consequentially perceive the ingroup and its
characteristics as more prototypical of the superordinate category than
the outgroup and its characteristics. Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, and
Boettcher (2004) have shown that when primary school and high school
teachers are confronted, both sets of teachers rate the traits of their own
group (vs. those of the outgroup) as being more typical of the superordinate
category teachers. Similar ﬁndings have been found for other groups (e.g.,
bikers, university students, etc.). Assuming that ‘‘humanity’’ (as opposed to
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animals) is a relevant superordinate category, the ingroup projection model,
in line with our predictions, would predict that ingroup, but not outgroup,
characteristics would be projected onto the human category and therefore
rated as more uniquely human.
Paladino and Vaes (2009) tested this hypothesis by giving participants
bogus information about the typical characteristics of their ingroup (i.e.,
Italians) and diﬀerent outgroups (Slavs, Albanians, and Belgians). Half of
the participants were informed that certain traits and emotions were the
typical characteristics shown by Italians when facing a new situation,
whereas the outgroup was said to respond to the same situation by
manifesting a diﬀerent set of traits and emotions. For the rest of the
participants the emotions and the personality traits assigned to the ingroup
and the outgroup were reversed. Subsequently a second, ostensibly
unrelated, questionnaire was given in which participants were asked to
judge a list of traits and emotions, including the characteristics that were
previously associated with the ingroup and the outgroup. As expected, the
characteristics were rated more human when said to characterise the ingroup
than when they were said to characterise the outgroup (see Table 2). These
results occurred independently of the valence of the characteristics and
of the speciﬁc trait or emotion that was used to diﬀerentiate between the
ingroup or the outgroup. As such, these ﬁndings demonstrate that
humanness is not only expressed through certain attributes (i.e., secondary
emotions), but is an intrinsic part of our category membership that gets
generalised to all things that are associated to our ingroup.
Stereotypes characterise groups, by deﬁnition also including one’s own
group. Based on the conclusion of the studies of Paladino and Vaes (2009),
stereotypes become likely candidates to convey humanness, an idea that was
recently tested by Vaes and Paladino (2010). Recent theories in intergroup
relations have shown that the socio-structural relations between groups
determine the content of the stereotypes that are attributed to these groups
TABLE 2
Mean centred humanity ratings and standard deviations (in parentheses) for ingroup
and outgroup characteristics, Studies 1–3
Study 1
Italians versus Slavs
Study 2
Italians versus Albanese
Study 3
Italians versus Belgians
Ingroup .134 (.89) .104 (.93) .109 (.87)
Outgroup 7.132 (.93) 7.105 (.91) 7.108 (.89)
Taken from M. P. Paladino & J. Vaes, Ours is human: On the pervasiveness of infra-
humanization in intergroup relations, British Journal of Social Psychology, 2009, pp. 237–251,
with permission of John Wiley and Sons. Copyright John Wiley and Sons (2009).
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(Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske,
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Speciﬁcally, the stereotype content model of
Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2007) states that two dimensions, status and
competition, shape whether a social group will be seen as competent and/or
warm. While status dictates the extent to which a group is perceived as
competent, competition will inversely predict whether a group is seen as
warm and likable. The combination of warmth and competence judgements
can result in uniformly positive judgements and behaviour for those who
have both, whereas those who lack both are derogated and seen in a negative
light. People or groups that are high on only one dimension elicit
predictable, aﬀectively ambivalent judgements and behaviours.
Starting from the warmth and competence divide, Vaes and Paladino
(2010) looked at the uniquely human content of stereotypes in a large set of
intergroup contexts. In a pretest diﬀerent outgroups were selected that were
good representatives of one of the three outgroup quadrants of the
stereotype content model, excluding the high competence – high warmth
quadrant in which people mostly locate their ingroup (but see Cuddy et al.,
2009). A total of nine intergroup situations were put to the test. Three
outgroups were pretested as low on both warmth and competence
dimensions (Gypsies, Albanians, and Moroccans). The remaining six
outgroups were ambivalent: three had low competence, but were seen as
warm (Southern Italians, Brazilians, and Cubans), three others were instead
judged high on competence, but low in warmth (Americans, Japanese, and
Germans). Given that the study was conducted in the north of Italy,
Northern Italians constituted the ingroup in all cases. Each participant
judged only one ingroup and one outgroup. Participants were asked to judge
a set of traits indicating the extent to which each trait was typical of the
ingroup and typical of the outgroup. Subsequently participants had to
report the extent to which each trait represented a uniquely human
characteristic and the desirability of possessing each trait. These judgements
were analysed using hierarchical linear modelling that allows us to consider
the relations between the trait ratings on the four variables (humanity,
valence, ingroup and outgroup typicality, i.e., level-1 model) controlling
for the fact that these judgements were provided by diﬀerent individuals
(i.e., level-2 model). Taking the between-participants variation into account,
humanity and desirability judgements were entered at the same time as
predictors of the typicality ratings. This model was performed for each
intergroup situation, predicting the ingroup and the outgroup typicality
ratings separately. The resulting beta coeﬃcients expressing the extent to
which humanity judgements predict ingroup and outgroup typicality ratings
controlling for valence are depicted in Figure 1. These coeﬃcients are
positive the more the typical traits are seen as uniquely human, but negative
the more the typical traits are seen as more animal-like. Focusing on the
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ingroup, results indicated that the typical ingroup traits were also judged as
uniquely human. All the bars that refer to the ingroup were positive and
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating that overall ingroup stereotypes
are seen as uniquely human, independent of their valence and of the speciﬁc
outgroup with which the ingroup was confronted. There was only one
exception, when Italians were judged together with Germans. Possibly the
German–Italian intergroup situation activated the larger European context,
merging both groups in a single super-ordinate category and reducing the
need to diﬀerentiate the ingroup from the outgroup in terms of humanness
(cf., Gaunt, 2009).
When looking at the results for the outgroup, more variability was
observed. Even though the relation between humanity and typicality
judgements tended to be negative, it was not always signiﬁcant. In
particular, outgroups with ambivalent stereotypes (either low competence,
and high warmth or high competence, and low warmth) did not always show
a negative relation. Among these outgroups only the Cubans and the
Japanese were signiﬁcantly denied full humanness. In contrast, the traits of
the low–low outgroups always showed a signiﬁcant negative humanity
Figure 1. Beta values expressing the link between typicality and uniquely human judgements for
the ingroup and the outgroup in nine diﬀerent intergroup situations (taken from J. Vaes &M. P.
Paladino, The uniquely human content of stereotypes, Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,
Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010, with permission of Sage Publications. Copyright Sage Publications
(2010).
Note: *Humanity coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating that people either
signiﬁcantly humanised the group (when positive) or dehumanised the group (when negative).
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index. This pattern indicates that the stereotypes of these groups tended to
be more animal-like, showing the active denial of humanity to these groups.
Overall, the data of the latter study of Vaes and Paladino (2010) concur
with a target-based approach to dehumanisation (Paladino & Vaes, 2009)
indicating that it matters to whom a trait is attributed. Ingroup stereotypes
were judged more uniquely human than outgroup stereotypes, and this
was shown to be a pervasive phenomenon. Independently of the speciﬁc
intergroup comparison situation, the more a trait was attributed to the
ingroup, the more it was judged to be uniquely human. This result could
imply that the ingroup was seen as uniquely human independently of the
warmth or competence with which it was associated. Indeed, a post-test that
analysed the level of warmth and competence of the most stereotypical
ingroup and outgroup traits showed that the ingroup stereotypes also
diﬀered in terms of competence and warmth as a function of the intergroup
situation. Figure 2 shows that the Italian ingroup was characterised with
more competent than warm traits when it was compared with a warm, but
incompetent outgroup, while it was especially seen as warm but less
competent when it was confronted with a competent, less warm outgroup
(see also Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Demoulin, & Judd, 2008). Even though similar
variations in warmth and competence inﬂuenced the perception of the
Figure 2. Mean competence (comp) and warmth judgements of the 10 most stereotypical traits
of the ingroup and the outgroup as a function of group typology (post-test, taken from J. Vaes
& M. P. Paladino, The uniquely human content of stereotypes, Group Processes & Intergroup
Relations, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010, with permission of Sage Publications. Copyright Sage
Publications (2010)). Trait judgements were made on 7-point Likert-type scales that ranged
from –3 (totally expresses incompetence [coldness]) to 3 (totally expresses competence
[warmth]).
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outgroup in human terms, the ingroup stereotypes remained invariably
human. This result can be linked with recent research that showed that
competence and warmth are not the most important dimensions to
positively distinguish the ingroup from an outgroup (Leach, Ellemers, &
Barreto, 2007). Focusing on the characteristics most important to a positive
ingroup evaluation, Leach and colleagues found that morality is more
important than, and largely independent from, competence and warmth
characteristics. Morality is a uniquely human characteristic, and together
these results suggest that people have a profound need to describe their own
group with deep-seated and uniquely human characteristics.
In earlier reviews of infrahumanisation theory (e.g., Leyens et al., 2000,
2003) it has always been taken for granted that infrahumanisation
comprised at the same time ingroup favouritism (humanisation) and
outgroup derogation (dehumanisation). Many researchers (e.g., Castano
& Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Viki et al., 2006) took the measure including positive
and negative secondary emotions as evidence that the concept went beyond
ingroup humanisation, and included the dehumanisation of the outgroup.
These two biases often work together, but they do not have to (Brewer,
1999). The present results support this latter case, and highlight the
distinction between the role of the ingroup and the outgroup in
diﬀerentiating both groups in human terms. In a number of intergroup
contexts (see Figure 1) this diﬀerence was mainly created through the
humanisation of the ingroup (i.e., when comparing the ingroup with
Southern Italians, Brazilians, and Americans); in other contexts a
combination of ingroup humanisation and the denial of humanity to the
outgroup caused the eﬀect (i.e., when comparing the ingroup with Gypsies,
Albanians, Moroccans, Cubans, and Japanese). This variation suggests that
the processes that guide people’s attribution of humanity to the ingroup or
the outgroup could be diﬀerent. Even though the ingroup was described
diﬀerently in terms of competence and warmth in the various intergroup
settings, as was shown in Figure 2, it was invariably seen as uniquely human.
The humanity that was attributed to the outgroup, on the other hand, shows
more variability than could be predicted on the basis of variables that
are known to determine judgements of warmth and competence. In the
following paragraphs we will discuss this possibility in more detail,
providing evidence that ingroup and outgroup humanisation are determined
by diﬀerent moderating variables.
Moderators of outgroup dehumanisation
An avalanche of theories have been proposed that explain and aim to
improve intergroup relations in general. These theories have studied many
moderating variables that play a pivotal role in intergroup relations. A
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broad look at these variables allows us to categorise them and suggests that
intergroup relations hinge on three structural elements: boundaries, relations,
and ideologies. Many theories have studied intergroup relations focusing on
that what deﬁnes a group; that is, its boundaries. Groups are social
constructions with boundaries that allow us to diﬀerentiate between us and
them, and tend to lead to the discrimination of those outside the ingroup
boundaries. Other theories deal with the most obvious moderating element;
that is, the relations between groups including status and power diﬀerences.
The third class of theories has tried to understand intergroup relations as
a function of the societal beliefs or ideologies of the group members, which
accentuate or play down disparities. We will use this framework to discuss
the diﬀerent moderators of outgroup dehumanisation and ingroup
humanisation. These diﬀerent moderators and their respective categories
are summarised in Table 3. We will ﬁrst introduce the moderators of
TABLE 3
Summary of known moderators of outgroup dehumanisation and ingroup
humanisation
Moderators
Boundaries Relations Ideologies
Outgroup
dehumanisation
. Identiﬁcation with a
superordinate
category (Gaunt,
2009)
. Ingroup gloriﬁcation
(Leidner et al., 2010)
. Nationalism (Viki &
Calitri, 2008)
. Status and
competence (Iatridis,
in press; Miranda
et al., 2010a, 2010b;
Saminaden et al.,
2010; Vaes &
Paladino, 2010)
. Power (Miranda,
Vaes, et al., 2010)
. Outgroup threat
(Castano &
Giner-Sorola, 2006;
Cehajic et al., 2009;
Cuddy et al., 2007;
Delgado et al., 2009;
Pereira et al., 2009;
Tam et al., 2007;
Zebel et al., 2008)
. Social dominance
orientation (Esses
et al., 2008;
Hodson &
Costello, 2007;
Leidner et al.,
2010)
. Right-wing
authoritarianism
(Hodson &
Costello, 2007;
Leidner et al.,
2010)
. Conservatism
(DeLuca-McLean
& Castano, 2009)
Ingroup
humanisation
. Ingroup identiﬁcation
(Demoulin et al., 2009;
Paladino et al., 2004)
. Existential concerns
(Vaes et al., 2010)
. Occupational status
(Iatridis, in press)
. Neurobiologically
induced cooperation
(De Dreu et al.,
2011)
. Assimilative beliefs
(Miranda et al.,
2011)
WE ARE HUMAN, THEY ARE NOT 79
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [b
-o
n: 
Bi
bli
ote
ca
 do
 co
nh
ec
im
en
to 
on
lin
e I
SP
A]
 at
 11
:24
 09
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
outgroup dehumanisation, dividing them into variables that pertain to
boundaries, relations, and ideologies.
Boundaries moderating outgroup dehumanisation
The centrality of categorisation processes and thus group boundaries in
understanding intergroup relations in social psychology can hardly be
underestimated (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Changing group boundaries
is central in improving the coexistence between groups (e.g., Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000; Wilder, 1981), their deﬁnition makes ingroup members
essentially the same to one another, and diﬀerent from outgroup others (e.g.,
Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), and provides meaning and security to its
constituents (Castano & Dechesne, 2005).
Identiﬁcation with a superordinate category. Research in the realm of
infrahumanisation theory has always emphasised the intergroup nature of
the phenomenon (Cortes et al., 2005). Given that groups are unthinkable
without boundaries, attributing humanness to outgroups will likely depend
on psychological shifts in these boundaries. Gaunt (2009) gave an interesting
demonstration of this idea applying the Common Ingroup Identity Model
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to the attribution of outgroup dehumanisation.
In two correlational studies Israeli Jews (Study 1) and Israeli Arabs (Study
2) served as participants and their identiﬁcation with the Israeli super-
ordinate category was measured. Results revealed that the more participants
perceived the ingroup and the outgroup as sharing a common superordinate
category, the more they attributed secondary emotions to the outgroup,
reducing the diﬀerence in humanness between the ingroup and the outgroup.
Importantly, these shifts in social categorisation did not inﬂuence the
attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup, but only increased the
humanness that was attributed to the outgroup.
Ingroup gloriﬁcation and nationalism. While boundaries create distinct
entities, people place themselves within or outside these boundaries,
diﬀerentiating between ingroups and outgroups and developing diﬀerent
kinds of attachments with these groups. Even with the ingroup diﬀerent
types of identiﬁcation can be distinguished. Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan
(2006), for example, proposed a bidimensional view of identiﬁcation
diﬀerentiating between attachment and gloriﬁcation. When attached to
one’s national identity, attachment is linked with patriotism and includes a
subjective positive identiﬁcation with the essence and common fate of the
ingroup. Gloriﬁcation instead starts from a comparative judgement and
implies that one believes that one’s ingroup is superior to outgroups on a
variety of dimensions. Measuring this diﬀerence in ingroup identiﬁcation,
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Leidner, Castano, Zaiser and Giner-Sorolla (2010) showed that only
ingroup gloriﬁcation, but not ingroup attachment, was linked to outgroup
dehumanisation. Speciﬁcally, these authors showed that high levels of
ingroup gloriﬁcation made people resist justice for the victims of their
ingroup’s mistreatment. Dehumanisation of the victim’s outgroup and
minimisation of the victim’s emotional suﬀering mediated this relationship.
For the present purpose it is important that feelings of ingroup superiority
increased the explicit dehumanisation of an outgroup, while ingroup
identiﬁcation did not.
A similar ﬁnding was reported by Viki and Calitri (2008), who showed
that only the endorsement of nationalism was linked with increased
dehumanisation, while patriotism even showed a signiﬁcant inverse
tendency, decreasing the diﬀerential attribution of uniquely human
emotions to the ingroup and the outgroup. Importantly, the eﬀect of
nationalism on the diﬀerential attribution of uniquely human emotions was
mostly due to variations in the attribution of these emotions to the outgroup
(Viki, T., personal communication 16 December 2010).
Relations moderating outgroup dehumanisation
Many diﬀerent relational variables have been studied that moderate people’s
attitudes towards outgroup members (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010).
Cooperation within groups and competition between them were the central
elements in the realistic conﬂict theory of Sherif and his colleagues’ initial
attempt to understand prejudice (Sherif, Harvey, White, Wood, & Sherif,
1961). Competition was retrieved by Fiske and colleagues (2007) and linked
with people’s judgements of warmth, one of the fundamental dimensions
in social judgement. The other universal dimension is competence and is
dictated by status diﬀerences between groups. Power is a most valued
resource and inequality of power directly changes the way people treat each
other (Guinote, 2007). Finally, threat perceptions are a recurrent reality
when dealing with diﬀerent groups and have been amply studied in the
realm of intergroup relations (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 2000). These
relational variables have shown their importance in understanding inter-
group behaviour and are likely candidates to moderate people’s tendency to
dehumanise the outgroup.
Status and competence. The initial empirical evidence in favour of
infrahumanisation theory showed that both low- and high-status groups
dehumanise the outgroup. Leyens and colleagues (2001), for example, found
that Canarians (i.e., inhabitants of the Canary islands, and seen as a low-
status group) attributed fewer secondary emotions to mainland Spanish
people (high-status group) to the same extent as the mainland Spanish
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people did to them. Similar results were obtained in several independent
studies using a variety of methods (e.g., Demoulin et al., 2005; Paladino
et al., 2002; Paladino & Vaes, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2011; but see
Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, 2009). These results led
researchers to conclude that status diﬀerences between groups were not a
necessary variable for subtle forms of dehumanisation to occur, nor was the
dehumanisation of the other group a one-way bias in which only the
dominant derogated the dominated. It is true that the reasoning became that
the status of the outgroup did not play a role in the dehumanisation process
(e.g., Leyens, 2009).
For many years this reasoning obscured the importance of status
diﬀerences, until their role was tested through their link with competence
(Fiske et al., 2007). In a study reported in Haslam, Loughnan, et al. (2008)
evidence was found for a direct link between the senses of humanness
(human uniqueness and human nature) and the universal dimensions of
social judgement (warmth and competence). Their results indicated that
these dimensions were related, but at the same time meaningfully distinct.
While human nature ratings tended to be positively related with both
warmth and competence, groups that were judged high on human
uniqueness tended to be seen as competent, but not warm. On the basis of
this link it can be expected that low-status outgroups should be seen as less
uniquely human compared to high-status outgroups. Given that we
compared a large set of outgroups, Vaes and Paladino (2010) could verify
this hypothesis in the above-mentioned study. A contrast analysis (for
details see Vaes & Paladino, 2010) that compared the humanity coeﬃcients
of the competent outgroups to the other outgroups revealed that overall the
competent, high-status outgroups were seen as more human than the low-
status, less competent outgroups (see Figure 1). The same was not found for
the humanisation of the ingroup that did not vary in terms of competence or
status; also the warm outgroups were not seen as diﬀerentially more or less
human compared to the other types of outgroups.
This result was recently replicated experimentally using an adapted
minimal group paradigm and measuring the attribution of secondary
emotions (Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira, & Vaes, 2010b). In this study
participants were led to believe, following a bogus personality test, that
they belonged to a group that had either high or low competence and high
or low warmth (excluding the low-warmth and low-competence ingroup;
apparently no social group allocates itself in this quadrant; see Cuddy et al.,
2009). At the same time participants were also confronted with a diﬀerent
group of people that represented another quadrant of the stereotype content
model. All diﬀerent combinations that paired the diﬀerent ingroups and
outgroups were presented to participants in separate conditions, except for
the ones in which the ingroup and the outgroup would be the same. As such,
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a total of 9 conditions (i.e., 3 types of ingroups 6 4 types of outgroups
minus 3 situations in which the ingroup and the outgroup would get the
same feedback) were created. Results indicated that diﬀerences in
competence between the groups moderated participants’ tendency to
dehumanise the outgroup. Only when the ingroup had more competence
than the outgroup did participants attribute more secondary emotions to the
ingroup compared to the outgroup. Instead, when the intergroup situations
in which the ingroup and the outgroup diﬀered in warmth were compared,
no moderation was found.
Other evidence that shows that status can play a role in the
dehumanisation of the outgroup comes from research that has focused on
the ‘‘lowest of the low’’; those outgroups that not only have low status, but
are often marginalised in society and are marked by overt prejudice. That
these groups are especially dehumanised has been shown most dramatically
by Harris and Fiske (2006, 2009). These authors compared groups from the
four quadrants of the stereotype content model and tested the prediction
that only outgroups that are both hostile (not warm) and incompetent
would be dehumanised. Measuring neural responses using an fMRI and
focusing on the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the region of the brain
that is recruited for social judgements, these authors found mPFC activation
for all social groups except for the extreme outgroups (i.e., drug addicts and
homeless people). These outgroups were also marked by greater activation
in both the amygdala and the insula consistent with disgust reactions,
the emotion that, according to the stereotype content model, is mainly
associated with these groups. This neural evidence was interpreted in terms
of dehumanisation, since these speciﬁc outgroups did not induce brain
activation that was diﬀerent from that evoked by (disgusting) objects. Other
research on moral dilemmas, where the death of one person could save the
life of ﬁve other people, shows that it is judged most acceptable morally to
sacriﬁce the life of a member of a low–low outgroup to save ﬁve ingroup
members, and it is least acceptable to save the low–low outgroup members
when an ingroup member has to die. Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, and Fiske
(2010) found special neural correlates for these evaluations.
Similar results can be found in the study by Vaes and Paladino (2010).
Figure 1 shows that it is particularly outgroups that are perceived to lack
both warmth and competence that are denied full humanness. Other
evidence stems from research that measured the dehumanisation of so-called
primitive people. Saminaden, Loughnan, and Haslam (2010) compared the
human associations with people that were portrayed in either a traditional,
primitive fashion or a more modern and contemporary way. These authors
created two diﬀerent sets of pictures that were matched on multiple
parameters (i.e., age, gender, frontal pose, gaze direction, attractiveness,
facial expression, and skin tone) depicting members of traditional societies
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or industrialised modern societies. Conﬁrming the belief that primitive
people are trapped in an earlier evolutionary stage and therefore are lesser
beings, these people were more easily associated with animal-like traits and
images compared to modern people. Importantly, these ﬁndings emerged on
both implicit and more explicit measures.
Together these data conﬁrm the idea that low-status outgroups that are
disliked and marginalised are the most likely victims of dehumanisation and
are confronted with harsher forms of human denial than other outgroups.
Given their special status, would these outgroups that are clearly dominated
dare to dehumanise their oppressor? Previously the role of status was tested
by comparing groups that had relative status diﬀerences, in which the
low-status group was not literally dominated by the high-status outgroup.
As such, Italians or Belgians were the low-status group when compared with
Americans, or Canarians were the low-status group when compared with
mainland Spanish people. In none of these situations did low status imply
being truly dominated and marginalised as immigrant groups often are in
their host country, or Gypsies are across Europe. Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira
and Vaes (2010a) tried to answer this question by using Portuguese Gypsies
and Blacks as participants who judged the high-status White Portuguese
outgroup. First participants were asked to generate the characteristics that
they considered to be human. Each attribute on the resulting list of
characteristics then had to be allocated to the ingroup and the outgroup.
Both Gypsies and Blacks attributed equal amounts of human characteristics
to their ingroup and to the White Portuguese outgroup. Using the same
method, however, the White Portuguese outgroup dehumanised both
low-status outgroups. These results suggest that truly low-status groups
do not dehumanise the dominant outgroup so easily. Of course we cannot be
sure that status is the key variable, as these groups are also marked by other
unique factors, one of which is the lack of power.
Power. Strangely, power has hardly been studied in relation to
dehumanisation. Given that dehumanisation is the derogating response
par excellence that identiﬁes people with a lower level of being, it is
especially hard to imagine that power would not be an important variable in
moderating this phenomenon.
To test the importance of power, however, it could be interesting to look
at the dehumanising tendencies of the powerless. Could it be, for instance,
that the low-status and marginalized outgroups we talked about previously
do not dehumanise the dominant outgroup because they see themselves as
lacking power? We tested this hypothesis in a study that confronted
psychology and medical students of the University of Padova (Miranda,
Vaes, & Gouveia-Pereira, 2010). These groups were chosen because
psychology students are seen as having lower status than medical students.
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Participants, who were all psychology students, thought that they were
volunteering in an opinion poll organised by the university on some highly
relevant topics. Once they had given their opinion, they were informed in the
low power condition that the university had decided that the opinion of
psychology students would only count for 20% and that of the medical
students for 80%, while the reverse distribution was used in the high power
condition. This information was justiﬁed in both cases by the diﬀerences in
the numbers of students between the two faculties and was given some kind
of legitimacy in this way. Immediately afterwards the same participants
were asked to participate in an unrelated study that was interested in the
perception of psychology and medical students. Results conﬁrmed the
expectations and showed that the ingroup was only seen as more human
than the high-status outgroup when psychology students were given the
illusion of power. Of course, more research is needed to ascertain the
combined role of power and status. For now, these results seem to suggest
that a minimal sense of power is necessary for subtle dehumanisation to
occur among low-status groups, at least when confronted with a high-status
outgroup. As such, power could resolve some of the contradictory ﬁndings
that were found previously, and explain why certain low-status groups do,
and others do not, dehumanise a high-status outgroup.
Outgroup threat. Blatant forms of dehumanisation have often been
reported in intractable conﬂicts marked by cruelty and violence. Suzanne
Goldenberg (The Guardian Weekly, 12 August 2002) reported some striking
examples from Israeli and Palestinian civilians at the start of the second
Intifada:
Israeli: ‘‘One thing that is hard to explain is this tremendous rage at the Palestinians
in which you dehumanise them, in which you can just do anything to them with
utter disregard to them as human beings.’’
Palestinian: ‘‘There are no civilians in Israel. All the Israelis are military. No
woman, no children, no ordinary people struggling to survive. Only massed ranks
of soldiers, not quite human.’’
In its original formulations dehumanisation was seen as an extreme response
that was fuelled by hatred and could only occur in severe conﬂict situations.
Even though the more recent accounts of dehumanisation have shown it to
be a broader phenomenon that plays a role in almost all human encounters,
the current research on dehumanisation has never completely abandoned its
origins. These recent accounts have therefore tested the role of dehumanisa-
tion in understanding conﬂict and processes of reconciliation. One line of
research has shown that the dehumanisation of threatening others decreases
the likelihood that people want to restore relations with previously
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conﬂictual outgroups. For example, Tam and colleagues’ (2007) correla-
tional study in Northern Ireland showed that both Protestants and
Catholics were less likely to forgive the outgroup for past atrocities the
more they dehumanised them. Cehajic, Brown, and Gonzalez (2009)
conducted studies focusing on the aftermath of the Bosnian war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and on reminders of the atrocities committed against
the Mapuche (indigenous group) in Chile. In both contexts dehumanisation
of the outgroup was negatively related with the extent to which participants
empathised with the victims of these conﬂicts. Similarly, Cuddy, Rock, and
Norton (2007) found that, after the Katrina hurricane in the US, White and
Black American participants dehumanised members of the other ethnicity,
and the more they did so, the less help they were ready to provide to the
ethnic outgroup. Finally, Zebel, Zimmerman, Viki, and Doosje (2008)
reminded their Dutch participants of the inability of the Dutch UN soldiers
to prevent the massacre of more than 7000 Muslims in Srebrenica, and
found that the more these participants dehumanised the Bosnian Muslims,
the less they were willing to support reparation policies.
All these studies show that the dehumanisation of a (once) threatening
outgroup may enable people to morally disengage (Bandura, 1999) from the
ingroup’s responsibility for harming the outgroup in the ﬁrst place. Through
this process they can refrain from getting involved with the outgroup’s
suﬀering and do not feel the moral obligation to reconcile their diﬀerences.
This process was clearly demonstrated by Castano and Giner-Sorola (2006)
who showed that victims of past wrongdoings were seen as less human
when ingroup members were explicitly reminded that their group had
been responsible for these atrocities. According to these authors, denying
humanity to others serves to morally disengage from self-sanctions by
justifying the harm one’s group has caused to another (Bandura, 1999).
While these studies have shown that dehumanisation can help to justify
negative treatment (or the absence of a positive treatment) of a threatening
outgroup, a recent study has shown another dynamic relation between
threat and outgroup dehumanisation. Manipulating the humanity of a
disliked outgroup, Pereira, Vala, and Leyens (2009) showed that people were
more willing to discriminate against a less human outgroup. Moreover,
perceptions of symbolic threat were shown to mediate this relationship in
such a way that symbolic threat justiﬁed the discrimination of the outgroup.
A less human outgroup is seen as a greater symbolic threat to the ingroup’s
values and norms and justiﬁes a discriminatory reaction.
Still, the threat need not necessarily come from the outgroup. Delgado,
Rodriguez, Vaes, Leyens, and Betancor (2009) tested a violence-triggers-
threat hypothesis investigating whether participants’ exposure to generic
violence can induce outgroup dehumanisation, even when neither the
ingroup nor the outgroup was directly involved in the depicted violence or
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its victims. These authors primed participants with human violence
compared to animal violence in Study 1, and with human violent or human
suﬀering pictures in Study 2, and showed in both studies that only a human
violence prime made people dehumanise the outgroup. These results conﬁrm
the idea that generic violent contexts are able to trigger less than human
perceptions of the outgroup.
Ideologies moderating outgroup dehumanisation
Ideologies are societal beliefs held by individuals that often colour their
intergroup perceptions. For years ideologies have been a neglected research
topic that has regained its full importance only recently (Jost, 2006; Sidanius
& Pratto, 1999). Several studies that have been published in recent years
have looked at the inﬂuence of people’s ideologies on the dehumanisation
of the outgroup. The two ideologies that were measured and related to
dehumanisation on diﬀerent occasions are Social Dominance Orientation
(SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA;
Altemeyer, 2006). High-SDO individuals believe that the existence of social
hierarchies and intergroup inequality is justiﬁed and a natural product of
a competitive society. For these individuals, ingroup superiority is a given
and discriminating against others is a way to attain or maintain group
dominance. Therefore it should not come as a surprise that research has
mostly found that outgroup dehumanisation is exacerbated among high-
SDO individuals (see, for example, Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008;
Hodson & Costello, 2007; Leidner et al., 2010).
Right-wing authoritarians generally subscribe to traditional values, are
submissive to authorities, and are aggressive against individuals who
threaten their norms and social stability. Here results have been mixed.
While Hodson and Costello (2007) have found no direct eﬀect of RWA on
outgroup dehumanisation, Leidner and colleagues (2010) reported a weak
put positive eﬀect showing that high-RWA individuals tend to dehumanise
the outgroup more. A possible explanation for these discordant ﬁndings is
that high-RWA individuals would be especially motivated to dehumanise
those that are threatening to their ingroup and the values and norms they
represent. They are deﬁnitely more sensitive to the animal–human
distinction as Motyl, Hart, and Pyszczynski (2010) recently showed. Indeed,
depicting violence as instinctual or animal-like reduced the hostility of
people prone to aggression evidenced by a high RWA, especially when
mortality was made salient. The authors explained this eﬀect through a need
of high-RWA individuals to see themselves as distinct from animals.
Therefore these individuals can be expected to denigrate threatening others
on the human dimension. Another possible explanation focuses on RWA as
an extreme ideology that is less easily endorsed than some of its correlates.
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Conservatism is one such a related ideology and has been associated with
negative attitudes towards various outgroups (for a review see Jost, Glaser,
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Looking at conservatism and its potential
moderating role in the dehumanisation of others, DeLuca-McLean and
Castano (2009) investigated whether Caucasian conservatives and liberals
diﬀered in the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to ingroup
and outgroup victims of a natural disaster. While the ethnic background of
the target did not matter for liberals, conservatives attributed fewer uniquely
human emotions to the victim when their name was Hispanic, as compared
to when it was Caucasian. Importantly, no diﬀerences emerged for the
attribution of primary emotions or the humanisation of the ingroup as
a function of the political ideology of participants. These results provide
evidence for the link between conservatism and the perception of a minority
as less than human.
Moderators of ingroup humanisation
When thinking about dehumanisation we normally think of the denial of
humanity to an outgroup, disregarding the possibility that people create
diﬀerences between groups on the human dimension because of a general
need to humanise the ingroup. Mullen, Calogero, and Leader (2007) showed
that ingroup names or ethnonyms often directly refer to their humanness.
For example, the word ‘‘Rom’’ is used to denominate Gypsies and means
in their language ‘‘men’’. The word ‘‘Ainu’’ in the language of the Ainu
(indigenous people mostly living in the Nord of Japan) means ‘‘men’’ or
‘‘persons’’. In African Bantu tribes the word for the people or humans is
‘‘bantu’’. While most researchers have begun to uncover the motivational
impetus of dehumanisation, focusing on the denial of humanness to the
outgroup, there has been less eﬀort to demonstrate the underlying
motivation for the humanisation of the ingroup. In the present review we
will discuss some of the moderating variables that were proposed in recent
research, analysing them in light of the structural elements of intergroup
relations.
Boundaries moderating ingroup humanisation
Ingroup identiﬁcation. The ﬁrst variable is rather self-evident and does
not need much explanation. Before people will be motivated to humanise
their ingroup, they need to value their membership and identify with it. Two
independent studies demonstrated this eﬀect empirically. Paladino, Vaes,
Castano, Demoulin, and Leyens (2004) showed that ingroup identiﬁcation
moderated the attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup, but did not
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moderate the denial of these emotions to the outgroup. More recently,
Demoulin and colleagues (2009) showed that varying the meaningfulness
of the intergroup categorisation criteria moderated the attribution of
secondary emotions to the ingroup. In this experiment participants were
allocated randomly to one of two groups, or selected on the basis of their
favourite colour, or were divided following their preferred professional
career choice. Results revealed that participants only dehumanised the
outgroup when they belonged to the latter two more meaningful categories,
but not to the random category. Interestingly, identiﬁcation also varied as a
function of this manipulation and mediated the increase in dehumanisation.
Even though speciﬁc analyses were not reported in this paper, the tables
clearly show that only the attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup
varied as a function of the manipulation, suggesting that the increase in
identiﬁcation only changed people’s tendency to humanise the ingroup (but
see Gaunt, 2009, Expt. 2).
Existential concerns. Until recently no clear answer was formulated to
the question of why the human category is so important in shaping one’s
social identity. Terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, &
Pyszczynski, 1997) has been proposed as a framework that could provide an
answer to this question (Goldenberg, Heﬂick, Vaes, Motyl, & Greenberg,
2009; Vaes, Heﬂick, & Goldenberg, 2010). TMT is based on the work of the
anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973), who states that the combination of the
animal instinct to survive and the humans’ awareness of the inevitability of
death gives rise to an existential terror. Becker (1973) argued that individual
members of our species would be paralysed with terror unless they
developed some means of managing this problem. Building on this idea,
Greenberg et al. (1997) found that the immersion in a cultural worldview
and the belief that one is living up to the system’s values serves an anxiety-
buﬀering function. Cultures provide a shared conception of reality that
gives structure and meaning to the lives of their members. This gives people
a subjective feeling of safety and death transcendence that protects them
from deeply rooted existential fears surrounding their vulnerability and
mortality.
Two recent extensions to TMT have made this theory an interesting
framework for understanding ingroup humanisation. One was articulated
and empirically tested by Castano and colleagues (Castano, Yzerbyt,
Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; for a review see Castano & Dechesne, 2005), who
suggested that because one’s social identity is a more symbolic, and less
ﬁnite, way to represent the self than one’s personal identity, the ingroup
acts as a buﬀer from mortality concerns in its own right. The second
extension stems from Goldenberg and colleagues (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000) who extended TMT to explain the
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ambivalence people often have when dealing with the more physical and
animalistic aspects of their existence. Our bodies get tired, stink, excrete,
and in doing so emphasise our animal nature and our physical limitations.
Therefore our bodies become a problem for humans because they make
apparent our vulnerability to death. In an abundant amount of research
Goldenberg et al. (2000; for a recent review see Goldenberg, 2005) have
shown that in order to minimise this existential threat, people not only deny
their similarity to animals but also engage in strategies that allow them to
emphasise the uniquely human aspects of the self. Taken together, the view
espoused by Castano et al. (2002), that the ingroup has a critical function
for terror management, and the work of Goldenberg and colleagues (2000)
that highlights people’s tendency to emphasise the uniquely human aspects
of their existence when they think of themselves as mortal beings, make
apparent the importance of preserving the human category for one’s own
group. In sum, to defend ourselves against the existential threat that is
associated with the inevitability of death, we have to endow our ingroup
with uniquely human characteristics and acknowledge it as the one and only
reality that can elevate us above the natural world.
This hypothesis was tested and conﬁrmed by Vaes and colleagues
(2010) who showed that people humanise their ingroup as an existential
defence against death reminders. In three studies, when people were asked
to think about their own death (i.e., mortality salience condition) they
endowed their ingroup with more uniquely human characteristics
compared to an equally aversive, but death-unrelated control condition
(see Figure 3).
In another study these authors demonstrated the buﬀering function of
ingroup humanisation to contrast death concerns. In this study participants
were not only asked to judge the ingroup or the outgroup under mortality
salience, they also had to complete a task that measured the extent to which
they still had death thoughts activated at the end of the whole procedure.
Results again revealed that when participants’ mortality was made salient
they attributed more uniquely human characteristics to their ingroup.
Importantly, the more they humanised their ingroup under mortality
salience, the more they showed a lowered accessibility of death thoughts at
the end of the study, showing that ingroup humanisation was eﬀective in
reducing their existential concern. It is important to note that none of these
studies found that making death thoughts salient increased dehumanisation
of the outgroup.
Relations moderating ingroup humanisation
Very little research has looked at the moderating role of relational variables
on ingroup humanisation. If anything the few studies that have measured
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ingroup humanisation seem to suggest that people do not humanise the
ingroup diﬀerently as a function of status (Vaes & Paladino, 2010) and
power (Miranda et al., 2010). A recent exception was reported in a series of
studies that focused on the role of occupational status in dehumanisation
(Iatridis, in press).
Occupational status. Status diﬀerences vary in the extent to which they
are consensually acknowledged and shared, and seen as a legitimate
outcome of intergroup comparisons. Most of the previously cited work on
dehumanisation that looked at the moderating role of status diﬀerences has
studied status in the context of national, ethnic, or regional groups. In these
contexts status diﬀerences are not always acknowledged and consensually
legitimated; instead they are often confounded with social competition. In
contrast, occupational status diﬀerences are more likely seen as consensually
shared and legitimate. When asked to rank various professions according to
their social status in terms of pay, for example, research has shown that
there is a large consensus even across diﬀerent countries (Kelley & Evans,
1993). Iatridis (in press) started from this reasoning and adopted the
emotion attribution paradigm of Leyens et al. (2001) to test the role of stable
and legitimate occupational status diﬀerences in the (de)humanisation of the
ingroup and the outgroup. In a set of three studies results conﬁrmed that
members of high-status occupational groups (e.g., white-collar workers,
Figure 3. Within-participant correlations between ingroup typicality and humanity ratings as a
function of mortality salience versus a control condition (taken from J. Vaes, N. A. Heﬂick, &
J. L. Goldenberg, ‘‘We are people’’: Ingroup humanization as an existential defense, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 2010 (Experiments 1–3), with permission of American
Psychological Association. Copyright American Psychological Association (2010)). The higher
the reported correlations, the more participants tend to attribute uniquely human traits to their
ingroup.
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lawyers, and secondary school teachers compared to primary school
teachers) dehumanised the low-status outgroup (e.g., blue-collar workers,
shop keepers, secondary school teachers compared to university teachers)
while the reverse did not happen. Interestingly, in two of these experiments
members of a low-status occupational group attributed fewer secondary
emotions to their ingroup compared to the members of a high-status
occupational group. Taken together, these studies show that occupational
status not only moderates outgroup dehumanisation, but can also change
the way we humanise our ingroup.
Neurobiologically induced cooperation. Little is known on the subject,
but the way we interact with people is at least partly regulated by
neurobiological mechanisms. Ethnocentrism, the tendency to view one’s
group as centrally important and superior to other groups, has recently been
proposed to depend on brain oxytocin levels (De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef,
Shalvi, & Handgraaf, 2011). Oxytocin is a neuropeptide that promotes trust,
empathy, and cooperation, but according to De Dreu et al. (2011) only
among individuals belonging to one’s ingroup. These authors reasoned that
such neurobiological mechanisms evolved to sustain and facilitate ingroup
coordination and cooperation. In a series of experiments participants self-
administered oxytocin or placebo and performed tasks assessing diﬀerent
manifestations of ingroup favouritism as well as outgroup derogation.
Interestingly for our purpose, one of these experiments measured the
attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup and the outgroup.
Results showed that oxytocin strengthened the association between uniquely
human emotion words and ingroup, but not outgroup targets. As such,
these data suggest that a neurobiologically induced sense of cooperation and
trust increases people’s tendency to humanise the ingroup without
necessarily increasing the dehumanisation of the outgroup.
Ideologies moderating ingroup humanisation
As far as we know no published research has looked at the speciﬁc impact of
ideological variables on ingroup humanisation. This gap in the literature
reﬂects the prevailing focus on outgroup dehumanisation rather than any
explicit theorising that these variables should not have any inﬂuence on the
attribution of humanness to the ingroup. Some recent results that were
gathered in our own laboratories could be indicative.
Assimilative beliefs. Among acculturation strategies (Berry, 1980),
colour-blind ideology (Maquil, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2009; Rosenthal &
Levy, 2010) comprises assimilation and implies that minority groups adopt
the position of the dominant outgroup. While assimilation is mostly
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preferred by the dominant host society (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2008),
immigrants often try to accommodate. Russian Jews of modest origin
immigrated to the Unites States after the wealthy Polish and German Jews.
The ﬁrst wave of immigrants was so ashamed of their less reﬁned and
educated members that they even tried to surpass US citizens to make the
gap with the Russian Jews as huge as possible (Berkowitz, 1978, personal
communication). In these cases the true ingroup is the one of immigrants,
but the ideal ingroup is the host one. Initial evidence in this direction stems
from two studies reported by Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira, and Vaes (2011),
one conducted on recent Brazilian immigrants in Portugal, and another
using Albanian and Romanian immigrants in Italy. In both studies
immigrant participants’ acculturation strategies moderated their tendency
to humanise the ingroup compared to the outgroup. Speciﬁcally, the
more participants expressed a desire to assimilate with the host society, the
more they humanised the dominant outgroup compared to their national
ingroup.
It goes without saying that people’s beliefs about acculturation and
integration do not constitute a pure ideological variable. Diﬀerent models
on the subject have emphasised diﬀerent aspects of the acculturation
concept: this includes relational aspects pertaining to the willingness to have
contact with the host society (Berry, 1980), more boundary-related
properties that have to do with the degree to which immigrants deﬁne
themselves within the bounds of both the original group and the host society
(Hutnik, 1986), but also ideological beliefs that shift between cultural
maintenance and cultural adoption (Bourhis, Moı¨se, Perrault, & Sene´cal,
1997; Maquil et al., 2009). The above-mentioned studies do not allow us to
identify what aspect of people’s assimilationist beliefs is driving the lack
of ingroup humanisation. However, these studies do open up the possibility
that people’s ideologies can moderate their tendency to humanise the
ingroup, and propose it as a domain where innovative research could be
developed.
Summary
In this section we have focused on the targets of dehumanisation and
introduced a target-based approach to dehumanisation. This approach
starts from the idea that what is human not only depends on inherent
qualities of certain characteristics, but is also a function of the target to
which these characteristics are attributed. This target-based approach to
dehumanisation paves the way to broaden the research on dehumanisation
in diﬀerent ways. First of all, it demonstrates that people’s need to humanise
the ingroup can be as important as their motivation to dehumanise the
outgroup in order to diﬀerentiate the ingroup from the outgroup in human
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terms. While most research on dehumanisation has tried to understand the
phenomenon by focusing on the psycho-social forces that make people
deny human qualities to the outgroup, this perspective highlights
diﬀerent motivations that mainly involve the ingroup and that could
clarify the process of dehumanisation. Previous accounts in the realm of
infrahumanisation theory often claimed that the infrahumanisation eﬀect
always involved simultaneous tendencies to favour the ingroup and derogate
the outgroup (Leyens et al., 2007). The present analysis and the recent
empirical extensions on which it is based (e.g., Vaes & Paladino, 2010)
propose that people ﬁrst of all humanise a salient ingroup with which they
identify. Whether they also dehumanise the outgroup depends on speciﬁc
socio-psychological variables that can play at any of the structural levels
that characterise intergroup relations.
Second, diﬀerentiating between ingroup humanisation and outgroup
dehumanisation allowed us to reconcile past ﬁndings with more recently
observed results, most notably concerning the moderation of status
diﬀerences. While earlier work did not report any diﬀerences in the
dehumanisation of high- and low-status groups, recent results showed that
high-status outgroups are dehumanised to a lesser extent than those with a
low status. The earlier focus on relative diﬀerences between the ingroup and
the outgroup probably contributed to hide the speciﬁc humanness of each of
the groups. New emphasis on the fate of both groups highlighted their
peculiarities.
Finally, treating the ingroup and the outgroup as separate targets that
can be attributed or denied human characteristics allows us to test the
possibility that they are driven and moderated by diﬀerent variables.
Intergroup relations and behaviour roughly hinge on diﬀerent moderating
variables that play at the level of group boundaries, the speciﬁc relations
between the groups, and group members’ ideologies. Using this framework
the research on dehumanisation was reviewed, showing with surprising ease
that ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation were mostly
moderated by speciﬁc variables. It is important to note that the attribution
of humanness to both targets was not always measured, but enough studies
have been conducted to conﬁrm that the attribution of humanness to both
ingroups and outgroups is often determined by speciﬁc factors. Processes of
re-categorisation (Gaunt, 2009), status diﬀerences based on national or
regional divides (Vaes & Paladino, 2010), power over the outgroup’s
outcomes (Miranda et al., 2010), a nationalistic attachment to one’s ingroup
(Viki & Calitri, 2008), and a conservative ideology (DeLuca-McLean &
Castano, 2009) only showed moderation of outgroup dehumanisation.
Instead, ingroup identiﬁcation (Demoulin et al., 2009; Paladino et al., 2004),
mortality concerns (Goldenberg et al., 2009; Vaes et al., 2010) and
neurobiologically induced cooperation (De Dreu et al., 2011) uniquely
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determined the attribution of humanness to the ingroup. These unique
moderators suggest that, in order to get a full understanding of people’s
tendency to dehumanise others, it is important to analyse the processes that
underlie both ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation.
DIMENSIONS OF DEHUMANISATION
Our previous focus on the target of dehumanisation should not conceal the
fact that in order to get a full understanding of the dehumanisation process
it is important to analyse the content and meaning of the characteristics that
are denied to dehumanised others. In this section we will discuss some recent
developments that unveiled possible intercultural diﬀerences in people’s folk
conception of humanness.
As stated earlier, Haslam (2006) diﬀerentiated between two senses of
humanness, human uniqueness and human nature, that when denied to
others lead respectively to two forms of dehumanisation, animalistic and
mechanistic dehumanisation. Both forms of dehumanisation have been
found in intergroup relations and can lead to diﬀerent biases that are not
necessarily opposites. Research in which both biases were measured has
often shown that the attribution of one sense of humanness is not correlated
with the other sense of humanness, suggesting that both judgements are
indeed independent and should be seen as complementary.
Importantly, denying human nature or human uniqueness is not
exclusively relevant in a speciﬁc context. Objectiﬁcation is sometimes
presented as more closely linked to mechanistic dehumanisation (e.g.,
Goldenberg et al., 2009; Heﬂick & Goldenberg, 2009). Denying human
nature should make a person resemble more a machine or even an object.
However, objectiﬁcation is often linked to gender and it suﬃces to note the
frequent associations between animals and sexy women: ‘‘they really are
animals’’, ‘‘they are panthers [eating rich old men], or cougars [eating
younger men]’’. Measuring the human–animal dimension, Vaes, Paladino,
and Puvia (2011) indeed showed that sexually objectiﬁed women were
dehumanised. In a similar vein, technical dehumanisation as used in medical
practice may recall the association of others with automata or robots.
Recent research has demonstrated the relevance of the denial of uniquely
human emotions in this context (Vaes & Muratore, 2011). Aliens, besides
their obvious association with mechanistic characteristics, can also be
dehumanised on the human-animal dimension. Castano and Giner-Sorolla
(2006) presented their participants with the story of a movie plot in which
a group of aliens were either accidently or intentionally killed by human
interference. Results conﬁrmed the hypothesis that the aliens were
associated with less uniquely human emotions when the human ingroup
was responsible for their deaths. These examples clearly suggest it is
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impossible to claim that the denial of one sense of humanness is uniquely
relevant in a speciﬁc context. It seems more correct to state that both senses
of humanness are complementary dimensions of social judgement that
contribute in speciﬁc ways to the way we perceive and behave towards
others.
Intercultural differences
Since Haslam (2006) introduced his model that diﬀerentiated between two
senses of humanness, the human concept, which until then had been vague
and all-inclusive, became for the ﬁrst time manageable and easier to
compare between cultures. Even though diﬀerent studies have conﬁrmed the
existence of these two senses of humanness across a variety of cultures (see
Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008; Loughnan, et al., 2010),
and a fair amount of similarity has been observed in people’s understanding
of both concepts (Park, Haslam, & Kashima, in press), there are several
reasons why diﬀerences might exist in the way these two senses are adopted
cross-culturally. Recent work on dehumanisation, for example, has shown
that people in diﬀerent cultures prefer to dehumanise others on one but not
on the other dimension. Bain, Park, Kwok, and Haslam (2009) confronted
Australian and Chinese participants. Results indicated that Australians
dehumanised Chinese only on the human nature dimension, while Chinese
participants diﬀerentiated between Australians and themselves mainly on
uniquely human characteristics. In contrast, Italians tend to diﬀerentiate
their ingroup from diﬀerent types of outgroups on both human dimensions
(Vaes, 2010). As far as humanness is central in shaping one’s social identity,
these results suggest that diﬀerent dimensions of humanness are important
in diﬀerent cultural contexts. Bain, Vaes, Kashima, Haslam, and Guan
(2012) tested this idea by asking participants from Australian, Chinese, and
Italian samples to name all the characteristics that came to mind when
deﬁning what it means to be human, judging these traits afterwards on the
human nature and human uniqueness dimensions. Figure 4 summarises the
standardised ratings of both senses of humanness for these participant-
generated characteristics. Not surprisingly participants named more
characteristics that were high in human nature, given that they constitute
core human characteristics. More interestingly for our purpose, this main
eﬀect was qualiﬁed by participants’ culture. Australians mostly named traits
that were high on human nature, but low on human uniqueness and the
reverse was true for Chinese participants, while Italians incorporated both
human nature and human uniqueness characteristics in their deﬁnition of
humanity. These results suggest that diﬀerent cultures deﬁne what it means
to be human in diﬀerent ways, emphasising the sense of humanness that is
most salient to them when making intergroup comparisons.
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Undoubtedly more research is needed that includes more cultures and
that could make it possible to unveil the cultural dimensions that determine
whether a speciﬁc sense of humanness will be seen as primary by the
members of a certain culture. At the same time this study could help to
explain some of the inconsistent ﬁndings on dehumanisation (e.g., Bain
et al., 2009) that were reported in diﬀerent cultural settings, and could help
future researchers to frame their ﬁndings within a speciﬁc cultural context.
Cross-cultural diﬀerences in folk conceptions could also help to explain why
certain treatments and practices are accepted in some countries but seen as
inhuman in others (e.g., the death penalty, extreme work conditions; see also
Bastian et al., 2011).
Summary
In this section we have focused on the deﬁnition of humanness. First of
all we wanted to highlight that both senses of humanness are
complementary and that none has a privileged area of research. While
the terms objectiﬁcation and technical dehumanisation as used in medical
practice may recall the association of others with automata or robots,
recent research has demonstrated the existence of the denial of uniquely
human attributes in both cases (see Vaes, Paladino, & Puvia, 2011; Vaes
& Muratore, 2011). A more important variable that determines whether
people will diﬀerentiate between groups in terms of one or the other sense
of humanness consists in one’s culture. Indeed, cultural variables seem to
play a role in people’s folk conception of humanness (Bain et al., 2012)
and could help to explain why they prefer one dimension of humanness
Figure 4. Mean standardised ratings of human uniqueness and human nature for participant-
generated characteristics.
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over the other when diﬀerentiating their own group from a relevant
outgroup (Bain et al., 2009).
CONCLUSIONS
In the last decade research on dehumanisation has witnessed a surge of
interest that is fuelled by some recent extensions of the concept which depict
dehumanisation as a general and pervasive phenomenon in intergroup
relations (Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000). Over 100 studies have been
published to date, and advance our knowledge in many ways. The present
review has proposed an integrative framework that aimed to organise this
vast and growing literature. The framework was built around the structural
elements of intergroup relations, discussing the often unique variables that
moderate and determine people’s tendency to dehumanise the outgroup
and humanise the ingroup separately. Dehumanisation indeed pervades
all aspects of intergroup relations. It aﬀords a crucial importance to
boundaries, aﬀects relations more than it mirrors them, and is nourished by
ideology.
This framework also allows us to identify some limitations and formulate
interesting avenues for future research. The present overview shows that the
research programme on dehumanisation relies heavily on correlational or
descriptive data. Often the moderators that were discussed earlier were
measured rather than manipulated. In part this is a direct consequence of
the fact that this research programme is grounded in real life, often testing
its hypotheses with real groups and using existing diﬀerences in socio-
structural relations to test their moderating role. There is great value in
testing one’s ideas in real-life settings, but this should not reduce the
importance of using experimental methodologies. In order to get a better
understanding of the processes that underlie and drive people’s tendency to
dehumanise the outgroup and humanise the ingroup, experimental studies
are a necessary tool and should play a more central role in future research.
More than the methodology, it is important to think about the processes
that cause or exacerbate people’s tendency to dehumanise others. The
present review shows that separating outgroup dehumanisation from
ingroup humanisation is important, because they are often determined by
separate variables. Outgroup dehumanisation has been the main focus of
research until now, but a greater emphasis on ingroup humanisation is
warranted. Often it is people’s tendency to humanise the ingroup that causes
groups to be seen diﬀerently on the human dimension. Ingroups are
psychologically primary (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000).
People live in them, and sometimes for them, and ingroup humanisation
resolves people’s basic needs like existential concerns (Vaes et al., 2010).
Table 3 is informative, in that it documents the main gaps in the literature.
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While boundary variables have been studied less in the case of outgroup
dehumanisation, both ideological and relational variables should be the
scope of future research on ingroup humanisation.
Finally, dehumanisation is bound to have a privileged connection with
behaviour. While earlier accounts of dehumanisation demonstrated some of
its behavioural consequences (Carella & Vaes, 2006; Vaes et al., 2002, 2003,
2004, 2011), more recently this link has received less attention (but see
Greitemeyer & McLatchie, 2011). Here too, diﬀerentiating between the roles
of ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation is likely to be
important. Ingroup humanisation may not be directly linked to the negative
treatment of others, but could indirectly promote and justify the unequal
treatment of others (cf., Brewer, 1999). Instead, outgroup dehumanisation is
likely to have direct negative consequences for outgroup members.
Dehumanisation is an important phenomenon that uniquely contributes
to our understanding of intergroup relations. Many interesting questions
remain and should further our knowledge on how groups relate and deal
with their diﬀerences. It is our hope that the framework proposed in the
present review can help to integrate the existing literature on dehumanisa-
tion and direct the ﬁeld in its future endeavours.
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